Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms by Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu
Allocative and Informational Externalities in
Auctions and Related Mechanisms￿
Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu
14.12.2005
Abstract
We study the e⁄ects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-
object) auctions and related mechanisms. Such externalities naturally arise in
models that embed auctions in larger economic contexts. In particular, they
appear when there is downstream interaction among bidders after the auction
has closed. The endogeneity of valuations is the main driving force behind
many new, speci￿c phenomena with allocative externalities: even in complete
information settings, traditional auction formats need not be e¢ cient, and
they may give rise to multiple equilibria and strategic non-participation. But,
in the absence of informational externalities, welfare maximization can be
achieved by Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms. Welfare-maximizing Bayes-
Nash implementation is, however, impossible in multi-object settings with
informational externalities, unless the allocation problem is separable across
objects (e.g. there are no allocative externalities nor complementarities) or
signals are one-dimensional. Moreover, implementation of any choice function
via ex-post equilibrium is generically impossible with informational external-
ities and multidimensional types.
￿Invited lecture at the World Congress of the Econometric Society, London , 2005.
11 Introduction
General equilibrium analysis has identi￿ed several forms of externalities as obsta-
cles on the road towards economic e¢ ciency. The First Welfare Theorem fails in the
presence of allocative externalities, i.e., when agents care about the physical con-
sumption bundles of others. Akerlof￿ s (1970) famous analysis demonstrated that the
First Welfare Theorem may also fail in the presence of informational externalities,
i.e., when agents care about the information held by others.
In contrast to general equilibrium analysis, auction theory is based on the premise
of individual strategic behavior. This theory o⁄ers explicit models of price formation
and allocative distribution that can be applied also to small markets. The belief that
auctions yield competitive outcomes even if information is dispersed is behind the
practical appeal of auctions, and behind their recent popularity.
Since Walrasian equilibria need not be e¢ cient in the presence of various forms
of externalities, it is of interest to understand what are the parallel consequences
of external e⁄ects in auctions, and in other related mechanisms. This is the main
purpose of the research summarized in the present paper.
Traditionally, the focus of auction theory has been on models that view auctions
as isolated events. In practice, however, auctions are often part of larger transac-
tions: for example, in privatization exercises such as license allocation schemes (see
Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2003, and the surveys in Janssen, 2004), auctions shape the
size and composition of future markets. Thus the auction typically a⁄ects the na-
ture of the post-auction interaction among bidders. On the other hand, anticipated
scenarios about the future interaction in￿ uence bidding behavior: already at the
bidding stage agents need to care about who gets what, and about the informa-
tion revealed to, or possessed by others, since these features will be re￿ ected in the
equilibrium of the post-auction interaction. Thus allocative and informational exter-
nalities naturally arise in models that embed auctions in larger economic contexts.
2This constitutes the main motivation for the present study.
In Section 2 we present a social choice model with a ￿nite number of alterna-
tives and transferable utilities that includes, as a special case, a general multi-object
auction model where the alternatives are partitions of objects among agents. The
model can incorporate allocative and informational externalities, as well as comple-
mentarities. We also sketch a typical application to license auctions.
In Section 3 we focus on the e⁄ects of allocative externalities. The induced en-
dogeneity of valuations is the main driving force behind a wealth of new, speci￿c
phenomena. Traditional auction formats need not be e¢ cient. They may create
incentives for strategic non-participation and yield multiple equilibria with qualita-
tively di⁄erent outcomes. We note that the presence of allocative externalities may
also be responsible for the emptiness of the core, thereby suggesting that allocative
externalities may be an important source of (coalitional) instability. We discuss the
use of optimal threats in revenue maximization, and the con￿ icts that arise among
various designer￿ s goals, such as welfare maximization and revenue maximization. In
particular, ￿ exible auction formats need not be preferable as they may allow bidders
to achieve more concentrated market structures.
Furthermore, we observe that in environments with limited commitment abilities,
resale markets ensure that, in the long run, the welfare performance is una⁄ected by
the initial allocation of property rights if agents are patient enough. But the ￿nal
outcome induced by the resale markets need not be e¢ cient, thereby suggesting that
a desirable initial allocation coupled with restrictions on the resale markets may be
preferable. The section ends with a brief survey of applications.
In Section 4 the emphasis is on informational externalities, and on several impos-
sibility results in such frameworks. In order to consistently and generally model the
preferences of bidders, private signals must be vectors rather than scalars. This fea-
ture distinguishes our framework from most auction models for a single object (that
3were the traditional domain of much of auction theory)1. Analyzing incentive con-
straints with multidimensional signals is technically complex, but indispensable. For
the general social choice model developed in Section 2 we characterize Bayes-Nash
incentive compatible mechanisms under the assumption that signals are indepen-
dent. A key requirement is that equilibrium utility (as a function of type) is a
convex potential. Simple corollaries include general payo⁄ and revenue equivalence
theorems.
We next proceed to show that, in the presence of informational externalities,
Bayes-Nash implementation of the welfare-maximizing choice function is impossi-
ble in generic settings with multidimensional signals. Thus, welfare-maximizing
multi-object auctions do not exist, unless the allocation problem is separable across
objects (e.g., there are neither allocative externalities nor complementarities) or sig-
nals are one-dimensional. This is in sharp contrast with the case of private values (no
informational externalities) in which the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mecha-
nism ensures that welfare-maximizing choice rules can be implemented in dominant
strategy whatever the dimensionality of the private information held by agents (and
whether or not there are allocative externalities).
We next explore which social choice rules can be robustly implemented in the
presence of informational externalities, where robust implementation refers to im-
plementation via mechanisms that do not ￿nely depend on the beliefs of the agents
or designer. In contexts with informational externalities, robust implementation is
associated with ex-post implementation, which is the analog of implementation in
dominant strategy in the private values setup. It turns out that no social choice
rule that makes use of the private information can be ex post implemented, as soon
1For one-object auction models that allow for several informational dimensions (e.g., on a private
value component and common value component), see, among others, Maskin (1992), Pesendorfer
and Swinkels (1998), Compte and Jehiel (2002a), and Jackson (2003).
4as two agents have at least two dimensions of private information. We contrast this
impossibility result with the characterization of dominant-strategy implementable
social choice rules for private values setups obtained by Roberts (1979). We also
identify non-generic settings where ex-post implementation and ex-post welfare-
maximization are possible. Section 5 concludes.
We wish to emphasize here that the present paper is not meant to be a survey of
auction theory and mechanism design: there is a wealth of interesting and relevant
issues that will not be addressed here. Interested readers can consult, for example,
Klemperer (1999) or Milgrom (2004).
2 A General Multi-Object Auction Model
We start with a general social choice model with N +1 agents, indexed by i =
0;1;2;::N and K social alternatives, indexed by k = 1;2;::K. Each agent gets
a private signal about the state of the world ￿










N) and so on...
Agents have quasi-linear utility functions that depend on the chosen alternative,
on private signals, and on monetary payments: if alternative k is chosen, and if
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The special case of auctions is included as follows: A set of M objects (possibly
heterogenous) is allocated among a seller (who will be called agent zero) and N
potential buyers. Here a social alternative is a partition of the goods among the
agents: P = (P0;P1;::PN); where Pi represents the bundle allocated to agent i: Let
2More generally, agent i0 s utility may depend also on monetary transfers made to other players.
These are situations with ￿ ￿nancial externalities￿ . We do not include them in our present analysis.
The reader interested in the e⁄ect of such externalities on auctions should consult Dasgupta and
Tsui (2004), Ettinger (2002) and Goeree et al. (2004).
5P denote the set of all partitions.
For each partition P, agent i obtains a signal ￿
i










P ): This speci￿ca-
tion includes a large variety of auction / mechanism design models studied in the
literature. Here are a few prominent examples:
1) For any partitions P and P 0 such that Pi = P 0












Pi). This is a ￿ pure private values￿model where
agent i only cares about the bundle allocated to her in each partition, and about
a signal pertaining to that bundle. There are neither allocative nor informational
externalities.
2) For any ￿ and ￿











This is a model where agent i only cares about his own signal about the parti-
tion, (i.e., there are no informational externalities), but i may care about the entire
partition of objects (i.e., there are allocative externalities)
3) For any partitions P and P 0 such that Pi = P 0
i assume that vi
P(￿) = vi
P0(￿).
It follows that ￿
j can be re-parameterized as ￿
j = (￿
j
X)X22M where X is a subset
of the M objects, and vi





Pi): This is a model
where agent i only cares about the bundle allocated to him in each partition (i.e.,
there are no allocative externalities), but i does care about the information about
that bundle available to other agents (i.e., there are informational externalities).
4) vi
P(￿) depends in a general way on the entire partition P and on the entire
pro￿le of signals ￿. This is the most general model that admits both allocative and
informational externalities.
5) Assume that there are no allocative externalities. If vi
Pi[P0




i(￿) for some bundles of object Pi;P 0
i; then this is a model that exhibits comple-
mentarities (substitutabilities).
A Typical Application
6In industrial organization contexts, allocative externalities often arise because bid-
ders care about the ensuing market structure that is a⁄ected by the auction￿ s out-
come. Informational externalities arise because private information on the cost
structure typically a⁄ects the competitors￿pro￿ts. Finally, information is natu-
rally multi-dimensional because there are various aspects to the cost structure and
di⁄erent objects for sale.
As an illustration, consider the recent European process of allocating UMTS
licenses to telecom ￿rms (for further details, see Klemperer, 2002 and Jehiel and
Moldovanu, 2003). The allocation proceeded via a sequence of national auctions
and beauty contests. We focus below only on the basic features that parallel those
in the model sketched above:
1) The auctioned objects were licenses to operate a third-generation mobile
telephony network in a certain country. The licenses di⁄ered in a multitude of
dimensions such as the size and distribution of the population, spectrum capacity,
duration, required investment size and deployment speed, etc...Private information
was multidimensional since many types of licenses were sold, and since the bidding
￿rms had heterogenous assessments about technical network requirements, present
and future regulatory frameworks, future demand characteristics, future operation
costs, etc...
2) The value of a bundle of licenses for a given ￿rm is given by the expected
revenue in the future market from holding that bundle, minus the required infrastruc-
ture and operation costs. The expected pro￿t crucially depends on the number of
licenses (or competitors) within one country, on their identity (e.g., small local ￿rms
or large supranational ones), on the license holdings of competitors in other coun-
tries (that determine what integrated services they can o⁄er), and so on... Thus, a
major feature was the presence of allocative externalities
73) In any reasonable oligopoly scenario, competitors￿cost parameters3 a⁄ect
one own￿ s pro￿t. Since competitors were likely to have some information about
their operation method, future technological development and future demand, the
auctions also involved informational externalities.
3 Allocative Externalities
In this section we review design issues that are related to the presence of allocative
externalities. In order to abstract from other e⁄ects, we ￿rst assume that there is
complete information, and we come back later to the additional phenomena due to
asymmetric information.
We illustrate a number of insights through the following situation appearing in
Industrial Organization models: There are N potentially active ￿rms in the market.
An innovation protected by a patent is auctioned among the ￿rms. The acquiring
￿rm is able to produce at a lower cost, but the magnitude of the cost reduction may
depend on the identity of the acquiring ￿rm. Let vi
i denote the change in pro￿t of
￿rm i if i acquires the innovation; vi
i is referred to as i￿ s valuation. Let v
j
i denote the
change of pro￿t of ￿rm j when ￿rm i acquires the innovation. This change of pro￿t
is caused by the modi￿ed oligopolistic competition after the innovation is introduced
(which is typically less favorable for j). We refer to v
j
i as the externality exerted by
i on j. This speci￿cation ￿ts into the general model presented above by noting that,
in the case of one single object, the partition P can be simply described by the ￿rm
i who acquires the innovation.
3This is just an example; information about demand parameters is another.
83.1 Endogenous Valuations
Assume that the innovation is auctioned using a second-price sealed-bid auction4.
That is, each ￿rm i submits a bid bi, and the ￿rm with highest bid wins the auction
and pays the second highest bid. Ties are resolved as usual.
In the traditional setup without externalities, it is a (weakly) dominant strategy
for ￿rms to bid their values for the auctioned object (see Vickrey, 1961). Here, the
mere notion of value is not well de￿ned. Indeed, how much i is willing to pay in
order to win very much depends on her expectation about who is going to win if she
does not. For example, if i expects j to win her net value of winning (compared to
the loss scenario) is vi
i￿vi
j. Similarly, if i expects k to win her value is vi
i￿vi
k. These
two values need not coincide, and thus it is impossible to say how much i values the
innovation, independently of her expectations over alternative market scenarios. Of
course, expectations must be consistent with equilibrium play. The observation that
valuations depend here on expectations translates into the possibility of multiple
equilibria with quite di⁄erent outcomes:
Example 1 (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 1996) Let N = 3;and let vi
i = v for all i. Let
the externality terms be: v2
1 = v1
2 = ￿￿, v3
1 = v3
2 = ￿￿ , and v1
3 = v2
3 = ￿￿ where
￿ > ￿ > ￿ > 0.
It is readily veri￿ed that, in one equilibrium, ￿rms 1 and 2 compete with each
other (since they are very afraid of each other). The resulting outcome is that either
￿rm 1 or 2 wins the auction and pays v + ￿. In another equilibrium, 1 and 3 are in
competition. The resulting outcome is that 3 wins the auction (because 3 is more
afraid of 1 than 1 is afraid of 3, e.g. ￿ > ￿) and pays v + ￿ - a much lower price
than in the previous equilibrium. Firm 2 is not willing to outbid 3 because 2 is not
that afraid of 3.
4The same insights apply to all other standard formats.
93.2 Strategic Non-Participation
In auctions without externalities, not participating in the auction is equivalent to
participating and making an irrelevant bid5. In the presence of externalities, this
is no longer the case. By staying out, a bidder may induce an outcome that turns
out to be more favorable to her than the outcome that would have arisen if she
had participated (see Jehiel and Moldovanu, 1996). We illustrate it through the
following example:
Example 2 (Hoppe, Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2005) Let N = 3: Firms 1;2 are in-
cumbents, while ￿rm 3 is a potential entrant. The incumbents do not value the object
(innovation, license, etc...) per se: v1
1 = v2
2 = 0. Moreover, v2
1 = v1
2 = 0. The en-
trant has value v3
3 = v , and it creates an externality v1
3 = v2
3 = ￿￿ on incumbents.
We assume that v < ￿.
If all ￿rms participate, there are, essentially, three continuation equilibria: two
in pure, and one in mixed strategies. In a pure strategy equilibrium, one of the
incumbents, say ￿rm 1, wins and pays v. In this equilibrium ￿rm 2 bids zero
since there is no point winning: that outcome is equivalent to the outcome when
she lets 1 win. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, ￿rms 1 and 2 mix between
a bid of zero (say), and a bid slightly above v, and the entrant sometimes wins.
The strategic interaction between incumbents resembles a war of attrition: each
incumbent is willing to deter entry but prefers that the other one pays the price of
entry deterrence. Assume then that one of the above bidding equilibria is played.
At least one incumbent, say 1, wins at price v with positive probability. But, 1
would be strictly better o⁄ by not participating in the auction. In that case, the
auction is among bidders 2 and 3, and 2 wins because ￿ > v. Clearly, ￿rm 1 bene￿ts
5Participation costs are assumed to be nul.
10from such a deviation. Thus, in any equilibrium, at least one of the ￿rms will choose
not to participate with positive probability6.
In Hoppe, Jehiel and Moldovanu (2005), we build on Example 2 to show that
increasing the number of objects may change the nature of the interaction between
the incumbents. When two objects are auctioned, the two incumbents have an easy
way to collude within the auction: each buys one object at price v, thereby deterring
entry. If allowing two entries is also an equilibrium, the two-object auction resembles
now a coordination game between the two incumbents, rather than a war of attrition
(as in the one-object auction). This is somewhat reminiscent of the ￿nding that,
in multi-object auctions, collusion may mean sharing the items for sale (see Wilson
1979). But, the channel through which this occurs here is speci￿c to the presence
of allocative externalities.
3.3 Participation Decisions and Optimal Mechanisms
We considered above standard auction formats. We wish now to analyze how the
auction designer can exploit the bidders￿participation decisions in order to increase
her revenue. The key observation is that, by augmenting the auction design by
appropriate threats, the designer is able to extract payments also from bidders who
do not win. This subsection summarizes insights from Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stac-
chetti (1996) (see also Kamien, Oren and Tauman 1992 for an early analysis of a
setting where non-acquirers make payments to the auctioneer).
Assume that all externalities are negative, i.e., v
j
i ￿ 0 for all i;j 6= i. If ￿rm
i stays out, the worst scenario for ￿rm i would be that the winner is ￿rm j(i)
where j(i) 2 argminj vi
j. We let vi = minj6=i vi
j, and augment the mechanism by
6The argument assumes that the set of participants is public information. One way to avoid
strategic non-participation is to keep the set of bidders secret. But, such policies may have other
drawbacks (see Compte and Jehiel, 2002b and DasVarma, 2002).
11the speci￿cation that if agent i does not participate, the winner is ￿rm j(i). In
line with the mechanism design literature we assume ￿rst that the designer has the
commitment power to implement such threats.
If ￿rm i refuses to participate, it will get a minimal payo⁄. In equilibrium7, all
￿rms participate, and the outcome is chosen so as to maximize welfare. This is so
because the designer can internalize social welfare by asking every ￿rm i to pay the
di⁄erence between i￿ s payo⁄ in the welfare maximizing outcome and vi.
Proposition 3 The outcome of the revenue maximizing mechanism also maximizes












The above argument can be viewed as an expression of the celebrated Coase
theorem8. Observe that, in the presence of allocative externalities, as soon as there
are at least three bidders, welfare is usually not maximized by standard auctions.
To illustrate Proposition 3, consider example 2 again. Given that v < ￿; the
outcome that maximizes welfare (among agents) is that the object is sold to either
incumbent (or, equivalently, that the seller keeps the object). The threat to either
incumbent is that, if either of them refuses to participate, the object is sold to the
entrant. The entrant is not threatened. Each incumbent is willing to pay ￿ to avoid
entry, and the revenue to the designer is 2￿9.
More generally, if the designer also cares about consumers￿surplus and not only
about revenue, then total welfare will be maximized in equilibrium, and the payo⁄
7There could, a priori, be equilibria where several ￿rms decide not to participate. But, by
suitably de￿ning what the mechanism does when several ￿rms do not participate, one can guarantee
that participation is a weakly dominant strategy. (see Jehiel et al., 1996).
8This holds despite the fact that the participation constraints are endogenous, unlike those in
Coase￿ s original analysis. The point is that reservation values can be set independently of the
chosen outcome.
9If we restrict attention to mechanisms where only the winner can make payments, the revenue
falls down to ￿.













CSi is the change in consumers￿surplus resulting from a sale to ￿rm i:
3.4 Credibility and Resale
In the above application, the designer can commit to personalized and ￿ne-tuned
threats. What happens if commitment power is limited? In Jehiel and Moldovanu
(1999) we consider10 a model where ￿rms can sell and further resell the object before
a (su¢ ciently far away) deadline T , at which time the current owner of the good
must use it. We assume that agents are unable to commit to actions at future stages
(in particular, they are unable to commit not to resell, or to sell to a speci￿c agent
if some pre-speci￿ed event occurs). At each stage, the current owner makes an o⁄er
to a set of agents. The o⁄er may include a sale in exchange for payments. If an
approached agent refuses the deal, one period of time elapses, and the owner makes
a new o⁄er. The main ￿nding of Jehiel and Moldovanu (1999) is:
Proposition 4 : The identity of the initial owner does not a⁄ect the identity of the
agent who consumes at date T. The consumer at date T need not maximize total
welfare unless all agents have veto power over all transactions.
The following example illustrates the result:
Example 5 Let N = 4, and let T ￿ 2. The values are: v1
1 = 6:5, v2
2 = 10:1, v3
3 = 9,
v4
4 = 7; v2
1 = v3
1 = v4
1 = 0; v1
2 = v3
2 = ￿1, v4
2 = ￿2; v1
3 = ￿2, v2




4 = 0, v3
4 = ￿1.
The welfare maximizing ￿rm is 1: But, no matter who the initial owner is, the
object will be consumed by ￿rm 2 at stage T: At stage T ￿1, ￿rm 1 sells to 2 without
10See also Brocas (2003) for a study of an auction with negative externalities where the seller
has no credible threats.
13extracting any payment from 3 and 4 because these prefer that 1 is the ￿nal owner
rather than 2. Firm 2 sells to 3 while extracting v4
3 ￿v4
2 = 1 from 4. Firm 3 sells to
2 while extracting v1
2 ￿v1
3 = 1 from 1.Firm 4 sells to 2 without extra payments from
1 and 3. At stage T ￿2, ￿rms 1 and 3 do not sell. Firm 2 sells to 4 while extracting
v1
2 ￿ v1
3 = 1 from ￿rm 1. Firm 4 sells to 3 without extra payment from ￿rms 1 and
2. At stage T ￿ 3 and any earlier stages, no matter who is the current owner, the
innovation ends up in the hands of ￿rm 2 at stage T.
A main feature of the above equilibrium is that, at some stages, ￿rms that oppose
the deal are simply excluded from the agreement. Veto power (i.e., the consent of
all agents is needed for a change of ownership) restores e¢ ciency.
If, resale cannot be forbidden, the above result suggests that it is welfare irrele-
vant how the initial property rights are assigned: eventually the same ￿nal physical
outcome results. But, it is erroneous to conclude that mechanism design is irrele-
vant. Indeed, since the ￿nal outcome need not be e¢ cient, it may be a good idea
to try to allocate the object e¢ ciently in the ￿rst place, and then control the resale
market to some extent11.
11An extreme option is to forbid resales, as was done in the case of spectrum license auctions.
14There are several limitations to the above model: 1) The result relies on the
existence of a deadline12; 2) There is only one object for sale; 3) Only the current
owner is able to make proposals. Gomes and Jehiel (2005) were able to generalize
the main result without these assumptions. They also show that e¢ ciency must
occur in the long run if the e¢ cient allocation of goods is such that no group of
agents can force a move to another allocation that hurts i without her consent.
3.5 Core and Externalities
We make now a brief detour to remind the reader that, from the viewpoint of
coalitional deviations, the presence of allocative externalities is a source of instability.
The following result is a corollary of Proposition 6 in Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996).
Proposition 6 Suppose that welfare is maximized by letting ￿rm i￿ buy the object.









i then the core of the associated market with externalities is empty14.
The intuition for the above Proposition is as follows: stability against coalitional
deviations requires welfare maximization, so that in any core outcome the object is
sold to i￿. Buyers j 6= i￿ can always refuse to make any payment, and buyers j 6=
12Chien (2004) analyzes the same model with an in￿nite horizon and focuses on the resulting
di⁄erences.
13When condition (??) holds, the welfare maximizing state i￿ is not negative externality-free (see
Gomes and Jehiel 2005) since the coalition of the seller and buyers in T can allocate the object to
i , hurting agents outside T [fi￿g . The spoliation is the key reason for the inexistence of a stable
outcome.
14With externalities, the core notion depends on assumptions about reactions to coalitional
deviations by agents in the complement. Our result holds for the most permissive de￿nition, the
￿-core, where the complement is assumed to choose the worst course of action from the point of
view of the deviators. Any core is empty if the ￿￿core is.





i￿ collectively. Buyer j cannot get strictly
more than v
j
i￿ as otherwise the coalition of the seller and ￿rm i￿ could do better
by just ignoring j. Thus, j must get exactly v
j
i￿. Thus, if above condition holds,
the coalition of the seller and buyers in T [fi￿g can improve on the candidate core
allocation by re-allocating the object to i rather than i￿. It follows that the core
must be empty.
3.6 The Con￿ ict between Welfare and Revenue
In this subsection, we brie￿ y consider an auction where the number of auctioned
objects is endogenously determined by the bidders￿behavior, and where externalities
are created by the e⁄ects on downstream payo⁄s15.
Consider spectrum auction. Conventional wisdom suggests that disaggregating
spectrum, say, into small capacity blocks, and letting the bidders aggregate the
blocks to form licenses of whatever capacity they need is a good idea. After all, the
designer is usually not knowledgeable about how much the ￿rms value the licenses,
or about how valuable extra capacity is. But, this argument ignores the possibility
that the auction￿ s ￿ exibility may be used by ￿rms to induce concentrated market
structures.
Example 7 There are four identical blocks for sale, and let N = 5. A bidder
needs at least one block (small license), and bidders may buy up to two blocks (large
license). Each bidder i submits a schedule bi = (bi(1);bi(2)) where bi(m) is the bid
for m blocks, m = 1;2. Blocks are allocated and payments are made according to a
uniform price auction. For any partition P of the four blocks in which ￿rm i receives
m blocks, and a total of n ￿rms get at least one block, de￿ne vi
P = ￿(m;n):
15This is inspired by the German UMTS license auction that took place in 2001. The treatment
follows Jehiel and Moldovanu (2003).
16If ￿(2;2)￿￿(1;3) > ￿(1;3), the auction outcome is a duopoly because the extra
pro￿t gained by switching from a small license in a triopoly to a large license in a
duopoly is larger than the pro￿t with a small license in triopoly. That is, two ￿rms
buy two blocks each, the equilibrium price for a block is ￿(1;3); and a winner pays
2￿(1;3). In contrast, a less ￿ exible format could, for example, mandate that three
licenses (two small, one big) are sold. The assessment of the two formats depends,
basically, on the partial derivatives of ￿. If the derivative with respect to capacity
is larger (presumably it is positive), the ￿ exible format is likely to be preferable. If,
however, the derivative with respect to the size of the market (presumably nega-
tive) is larger, then the less ￿ exible format is likely to be preferable because of the
increased consumer surplus in a less concentrated market.
Sometimes it is also argued that welfare maximization for bidders and revenue
go hand in hand in auctions16. But, again this view ignores that ￿ value￿ , and hence
￿ revenue￿may be driven by the desire to squeeze consumers￿surplus. Since the
value of a monopoly position is larger than the combined values of oligopolists, it
is intuitive that an auction for monopoly (which is a form of bundling ) will yield
more revenue than an auction that creates several winners that compete against
each other (at an extreme such an auction yields no revenue at all if ￿rms expect
a ￿ Bertrand￿type of interaction). But welfare, including consumer surplus, will be
small under monopoly. Thus, revenue and e¢ ciency may be quite unrelated to each
other if there are allocative externalities (see also Janssen and Moldovanu, 2004).
16There are many caveats to this claim even without allocative externalities. For example,
revenue maximization requires the use of reserve prices, or handicaps in asymmetric contexts, or
quantity discounts in multi-object auctions.
173.7 Private information
Private information on allocative externality terms can yield private value models
without informational externalities if i knows the externality terms vi
j caused to
her, or it can yield interdependent value models if i has private information on the
externality terms v
j
i she causes to others (of course, mixtures are also possible).
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) analyze a sealed-bid second-price auctions with en-
try fees and reserve prices in a model where bidders have one dimensional private
information that in￿ uences both their valuations, and the externality terms. Specif-
ically, in a two bidder model, ￿
i = vi
i is private information, and vi






j). This model captures situations where each ￿rm has
private information about the reduction on marginal cost induced by an innovation,
and where the cost structure is public information before the market interaction.
This model displays both private and interdependent value components: when i
compares the alternative where he wins to the one where the seller keeps the object,
his net value is ￿
i. When i compares the alternative where he wins with the one where




j), which depends both on i and
j￿ s private information. Only the second comparison is relevant if there is no reserve
price, and then the analysis is analogous to the one in Milgrom and Weber￿(1982)










The auction with a reserve price R is more interesting. For the sake of illustration,
assume that the externality function is given by a constant ￿e , where e ￿ 0; and
consider R inside the support of valuations18. The equilibrium is such that bidders
with valuation below R bid below R; (say zero), and bidders with valuations above
17With more than two bidders and with asymmetries, the features mentioned in the above
subsections (multiplicity of equilibria, strategic non-participation, etc...) appear also here.
18We also assume that the valuations are identically and independently distributed.
18R bid Thus, there is no relevant bid between R and R + e19. The reason for this
discontinuity is as follows: when the marginal type vi
i = R considers whether to
make a relevant bid or not, the benchmark is that the seller keeps the object. As
soon as a bidder makes a relevant bid, the e⁄ect of marginally decreasing the bid is
now that the other bidder sometimes wins. Thus, in the relevant bid area, the bid
function must be ￿
i + e.
Another interesting observation is that the seller￿ s optimal reserve price may be
below the seller￿ s valuation, a situation that never occurs without externalities20.
The reason is that, selling more often frightens bidders when there are negative
externalities, and therefore they bid higher in order to win.
In the case of positive externalities, the equilibrium bidding function still has
two distinct parts. But consistently combining the two parts requires now that a
positive measure of valuations ￿
i bids R21. Moreover, with positive externalities,
entry fees and reserve prices need not lead to equivalent revenues.
Moldovanu and Sela (2003) study a patent auction where the post-auction inter-





and pooling occurs even with negative externalities. Goeree (2000), Das Varma
(2003) and Molnar and Virag (2004) study a variant of the above model where the
cost structure is not made public after the auction. In this case, the winning bid
has the extra feature of conveying some information about the cost structure of the
winning bidder, and there is an extra signaling motive appearing in the bidding
strategy.
We now brie￿ y consider revenue-maximizing auctions. There are two di¢ culties
linked to the presence of allocative externalities: 1) Information is typically multidi-
19A similar discontinuity may arise in the a¢ liated model of Milgrom and Weber (1982).
20The optimal reserve price also depends on the number of bidders.
21Pooling also appears in the resale auctions studied by Haile (2000). The possibility of resale
translates into a "reduced form" positive externality.
19mensional; 2) Participation constraints are typically determined by the mechanism
itself and are type-dependent.
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1999) consider a symmetric, private values
setup with multidimensional private information and negative externalities: bidder
i knows her valuation vi
i and the externalities vi
j caused to her. For example, the








j: Thus, the equilibrium bids are set at valuation minus
average externality.
As in the complete information case (see subsection 3.3), the optimal auction will
include some threat in case a bidder does not participate. But, in this private value
model, there is no way to ￿ne-tune the threat for i by using information revealed by
others. It turns out that it is enough to care about the participation constraint of
the type whose valuation is smallest and whose externalities are closest to zero. The
threat (taking the form of a ￿xed allocation rule in case i does not participate) can
be designed so that the participation constraints of all other types of bidder i are
automatically satis￿ed as soon as i￿ s incentive constraints are satis￿ed. Thus, even
though participation constraints are a priori type-dependent, the fact that they
are endogenously determined by the mechanism (through the choice of threats)
allows us to avoid some of the complications inherent to exogenous type-dependent
participation constraints22.
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1999) show that a second-price auction with
an appropriately de￿ned entry fee is the revenue-maximizing mechanism in a class
of mechanisms where the object is always sold, and where agents are constrained
to make one-dimensional bids. They also characterize the equilibrium of the second
price auction with reserve prices, and show that it is never optimal to set a small
reserve price. Thus, either there should be no reserve price or the reserve price
22See Jullien (2000) for an analysis of such constraints in one-dimensional principal-agent setting.
20should be such that the object is not sold with a signi￿cant probability. This result
cannot arise in a one-dimensional setting with a smooth, strictly positive density
function, and it should also be contrasted with the ￿nding in multidimensional
monopoly problems where there is no competition among consumers. There, it is
always optimal to exclude some set of consumers no matter what the support of
consumers￿valuations is (see Armstrong, 1996). By contrast, in the auction setup,
it may be revenue-enhancing for the seller to always sell the good.
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) construct the revenue maximizing auc-
tion in a setting where bidder i knows her valuation vi
i and the negative externality
v
j
i ￿ 0 she exerts on other bidders j. This is a model with interdependent values
(or informational externalities). If i does not participate, the auctioneer optimally
decides to sell the good to the agent j(i) = argminj e vi
j where e vi
j is agent j￿ s report
in a direct mechanism.
Figueroa and Skreta (2004) generalize the analysis of optimal mechanisms to
multi-object settings with externalities, but assume that agents have one-dimensional
signals23.
Das Varma (2002) builds on the model of Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti
(1999) and he observes that the ascending English auction may sometimes generate
more revenue than sealed-bid auctions. This happens because bidders have incen-
tives to stay longer in the auction in cases where their worst enemy also stays in the
auction. The insight is particularly interesting in light of the revenue equivalence
theorem in auctions (see subsection 4.1 below): even in a symmetric, independent,
private values context with risk neutral bidders, the ascending and the sealed-bid
auctions need not be revenue-equivalent if there are allocative externalities.
Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) examine the possibility of collusion in the presence of
negative externalities among agents when private information bears on valuations.
23See also Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) and Brocas (2003).
21They show that information sharing among the ring members need not be e¢ cient
even if side-payments are allowed, which is in sharp contrast with the ￿nding in
externality-free auction setups (see, for example, Graham and Marshall, 1986).
3.8 Applications
Auction models with allocative externalities o⁄er an uni￿ed framework for all situ-
ations where competing ￿rms or agents buy important inputs that a⁄ect the nature
of downstream interaction. Some e⁄ects of externalities on bidding behavior have
been previously identi￿ed in the literature on the ￿ persistence of monopoly￿(see,
for example, the classical paper by Gilbert and Newbery, 1982 , and also Krishna,
1993 and Rodriguez, 2002) and in the literature on patent licensing (see the classical
contributions of Katz and Shapiro 1986, and Kamien and Tauman, 1986). Similar
e⁄ects appear in the auctions of capacity studied by McAfee (1998). Roughly speak-
ing, the general framework presented here extends ￿ the persistence of monopoly￿
approach beyond monopoly/duopoly market structures, and it extends the literature
on patent licensing by allowing for asymmetries between agents, and by considering
allocation mechanisms that go beyond standard auctions.
Inderst and Wey (2004) analyze large, auction-like deals (such as privatizations,
mergers and takeovers) that change the nature of an industry by a⁄ecting the number
and the identity of the operating ￿rms. It is an immediate consequence of the theory
of auctions with negative externalities that a takeover premium must be observed
in horizontal mergers where each ￿rm is negatively a⁄ected if the target is acquired
by another competitor.
Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002), and Waehrer (2003) study the properties
of bidding games and other mechanisms for allocating public goods or bads, such as
siting of hazardous facilities.
Maeda (2003) and Burguet and Sempere (2005) analyze trading models for the
22emission of noxious gases. Using some insights developed for resale markets with
externalities (see Jehiel and Moldovanu, 1999), Burguet et Sempere emphasize both
the inadequacy of bilateral trading mechanisms for internalizing all existing exter-
nalities, and the need for multilateral schemes. A related point is made by Bagwell,
Mavroidis and Staiger (2004) who propose an innovative auction of retaliation rights
for dispute settlements within the World Trade Organization.
4 Informational Externalities
In this Section we focus on the role of informational externalities. The theoretical
interest in such settings is not new. The classic contributions of Wilson (1969) and
Milgrom and Weber (1981) , and the large literature following them analyzed one-
object auctions with symmetric bidders. In contrast, the focus of the more recent
literature is on multi-object auctions, and on the e⁄ects of asymmetries (see Maskin,
1992) on welfare-maximization.
The section will be divided in several parts. In Subsection 4.1 we develop general
insights about incentive compatibility and payo⁄equivalence with multidimensional
signals. In Subsection 4.2 we inquire whether the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
analysis can be extended to settings with informational externalities. In Subsection
4.3 we ask which social choice functions (not necessarily welfare-maximizing) can
be implemented independently of the distributions of signals (i.e., in an ex-post
equilibrium).
4.1 Incentive Compatibility and Payo⁄ Equivalence
Recall the social choice framework described in Section 2. Agents have quasi-linear




N), and on a monetary payment ti : ui(k;￿;ti) = vi
k(￿) + ti
23The revelation principle asserts that, for any Bayes-Nash equilibrium of any
given mechanism, one can construct an equivalent equilibrium of a direct revelation
mechanism where all agents truthfully report their private information. Thus, for the
characterization results, we focus below on truth-telling equilibria in direct revelation
mechanisms.
Denote by vi(￿) the vector (vi
k(￿))k2K; and let ￿jKj￿1 denote the simplex of prob-
ability distributions over the ￿nite set of alternatives. A direct revelation mechanism
is given by a pair (￿;t) where ￿ : ￿ = ￿N
i=0￿i ! ￿jKj￿1 is the allocation rule, and
t : ￿ ! <N+1 is the payment rule.
We assume below that types are independent. Given a mechanism (￿;t); de￿ne
vi(￿i;￿
i) = E￿￿i[￿(￿i;￿
￿i) ￿ vi(￿)] and t
i(￿i) = E￿￿i[ti(￿i;￿




i(￿i) represents agent i0s expected utility when all other agents report
truthfully, and when i has true type ￿
i but reports type ￿i:













The function V i(￿
i) represents agent i￿ s expected utility in a truthful Bayes-Nash
equilibrium. There are several versions of characterization results in the literature.
The one below is due to Krishna and Maenner (2001)24:
Theorem 8 Assume that, for each i; the type set ￿i is convex and that ui(k;￿
￿i;￿;ti)
is a convex function of ￿
i: Then, in any incentive compatible mechanism (￿;t); the
expected equilibrium utility function V i(￿
i) is convex, and is determined by the allo-
cation rule ￿ up to an additive constant. For any ￿
i;￿i 2 ￿i, and for any smooth
24Although these authors give an independent proof, it has been pointed to us by Ennio Stacchetti
that the integral formula below follows from a known result in convex analysis. See Theorem 2.3.4.
in Hiriart-Urruty and Lemarechal C. (2001). For another result that substitutes convexity of the
utility function with a di⁄erentiability requirement, see Milgrom and Segal (2002).
24path ￿ joining ￿
i to ￿i in ￿i; it holds that V i(￿
i) = V i(￿i) +
R
qi ￿ d￿ where qi is a
subgradient25 of V i at ￿
i:
The main complication added by the presence of multidimensional signals is
the requirement that qi , which is fully determined by ￿; be a (sub)gradient of a
convex function V i: Whereas this requirement reduces to a standard monotonicity
condition in the one-dimensional case, it involves both a monotonicity condition,
and a di⁄erential condition on the cross derivatives of qi (yielding the path inde-
pendence condition) if signals are multidimensional. These consequences of multi-
dimensional constraints in the context of auctions have been ￿rst pointed out by
Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996, 1999).26
To get some geometric intuition about the added complexity, consider the fol-
lowing example:
Example 9 There are two objects, A and B , and one bidder. The bidder obtains
a two-dimensional private signal (vA;vB) about the values of the two goods. The
bundle is worth vA + vB.
Any deterministic, incentive compatible mechanism divides the two-dimensional
set of types into areas of constant allocation. The gradient of the equilibrium
utility is given here by the probabilities with which the bidder gets the objects.
Thus, the vector q is either (0;0); (0;1);(1;0) or (1;1): Convexity of V (or, equiva-
lently, monotonicity of q) implies that, as we increase valuations, q is only allowed
to ￿ jump￿ from (0;0) to either (0;1); (1;0) or (1;1); and from (0;1); (1;0) to
(1;1): This is similar to the insight obtained in one-dimensional models. But, there
25Consider a convex function F : C ! < where C ￿ <d: A vector x￿ 2 <d is a subgradient of
F at x 2 C if for all y 2 C it holds: F(y) ￿ x￿ ￿ (y ￿ x): Whenever F is di⁄erentiable (a.e.) the
subgradient is unique and coincides with the usual gradient.
26Analogous results appeared earlier in the monopolistic screening literature (see Rochet, 1985).
25is an additional twist here: if a jump occurs, the integral of q will not depend on the
path of integration (i.e., the vector ￿eld q is conservative) if and only if ￿ the jump
vector￿is perpendicular to the boundary between the areas where each alternative is
chosen. For example, the boundary between areas where the buyer either gets both
objects or none must have a slope of 45￿ (since the jump is (1;1) ￿ (0;0) = (1;1)),
while the boundaries between areas where the buyer gets either one object or two
are either horizontal, or vertical lines. While here these observations could be de-
rived from the Taxation Principle of monopolistic screening, the analog conditions
become very involved in auctions, where there are several interacting agents. The
requirement of conservativeness on the vector ￿eld q yields partial di⁄erential equa-
tions that determine boundaries, which need not be straight lines (for these insights
and an application, see Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti, 1999).
An important corollary of Theorem 8 is the so called payo⁄and revenue equiva-
lence result. Consider two incentive compatible mechanisms (￿;t) and (￿;s) that
implement the same allocation rule ￿; and thus yield the same expressions for vi
and qi: Choose an arbitrary type e ￿
i
; and let V i
t (e ￿
i
) and Vs(e ￿
i
) denote the expected
equilibrium utility in the truth-telling equilibria of (￿;t) and (￿;s); respectively.













































In other words, expected transfers in the two mechanisms are, up to a constant,
the same. Analogous payo⁄ equivalence results for dominant-strategy or ex-post
implementation can be proved along similar lines, but these no longer require that
the distribution of signals be independent across agents. Moreover, they deliver
equivalence up to a constant of actual transfers rather than expected transfers (see,
for example, Chung and Ely, 2001).
4.2 Welfare Maximization
In this subsection we ask whether the welfare-maximizing rule can be Bayes-Nash
implemented. Our main results (Theorems 10 and 11) assert that this is generically
impossible when agents have multi-dimensional private information.
Let us ￿rst brie￿ y review the classic insight of Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), and
Groves (1973) for private values auction where each agent i cares only about his own
private signal, but may care about the entire partition of objects (thus allocative
externalities are permitted).
For the auction application, we assume that vi
P(￿) ￿ vi
P(￿
i): For any pro￿le





j) to be a welfare-maximizing al-
location rule.27. Let P￿i be a partition of objects where agent i is allocated the
27If the argmax is not unique, any selection will do.









j) to be the welfare-maximizing partition of
objects in the absence of i:
The VCG mechanism is the direct revelation mechanism where, for each reported



















Truth-telling is a dominant strategy for each player whatever the dimensionality
of ￿
i, and whatever the form of vi because the transfers ensure that each agent￿ s
objective is aligned with the welfare criterion. Except in degenerate cases, agents
in a VCG mechanism have strictly positive interim incentives to report truthfully
because of the uncertainty (still to be resolved at the time of the reporting) about
the chosen alternative.
To simply state our impossibility results for frameworks with informational ex-
ternalities, we consider a linear speci￿cation of preferences, and we assume that the












ki ￿ 0 for all k, i. The signal ￿
i of agent i is drawn from a space ￿i ￿ RK￿N
according to a continuous density fi(￿
i) > 0 , independently of other agents ￿signals
￿
￿i.
Consider a direct revelation mechanism (DRM) (￿;t) where ￿k(￿1;:::￿N) is the
probability that alternative k is chosen given the report pro￿le ￿ = (￿1;:::￿N), and
ti(￿1;:::￿N) is the transfer received by agent i given the report pro￿le ￿.
Using the methodology developed for Theorem 8 , let V i(￿
i) be agent i0s expected
























































k(￿i) is agent i0s equilibrium interim expected probability that alter-
native k is chosen conditional on i￿ s report ￿i.
Recall that V i is convex, and hence twice continuously di⁄erentiable almost


















i) = 0 for j 6= i
By Schwarz￿ s Theorem, the cross derivatives of V i at ￿
i must be equal. This implies






























Consider now a welfare-maximizing allocation rule: ￿k￿(￿
1;:::￿







N). For such rules we can directly compute the induced in-
terim expected probabilities that each alternative is chosen. The impossibility result
is obtained by showing that these functions cannot generically satisfy (2) and (3):
Theorem 10 (Jehiel-Moldovanu 2001) Let (￿;t) be a welfare maximizing DRM,
and assume that the following conditions are satis￿ed. (1) There exist i, j, k such
29that i 6= j, ai
ki 6= 0 and ai
kj 6= 0. (2) There exists an open set of ￿
i such that,
depending on the realization of ￿
￿i, the welfare maximizing alternative is either k or
k0. Then (￿;t) cannot be incentive compatible.
Proof. Conditions 1 and 2 ensure that, for an open set of signals ￿
i; the in-
terim expected probabilities (that each alternative is chosen) induced by any value




kj 6= 0: This is incompatible with (3).
For the proof we have only used identities (3). This is enough because the signal
￿
i of agent i has dimension N ￿K, which, in particular, is larger than the dimension
of the alternatives K: The above result is not too surprising, as it seems impossible
to elicit an information that has more dimensions than the number of alternatives
the agent cares about. Maskin (1992) provided an early example with this ￿ avor,
but he used the stronger ex-post equilibrium concept.
It is important to understand what happens to the impossibility result if the di-
mension of the signals is no larger than K, the number of payo⁄-relevant alternatives,
i.e., when the simple insight obtained above does not necessarily hold. Consider














k: Identities (2) become now:
8i;k;k



















Theorem 11 (Jehiel-Moldovanu 2001) Let (￿;t) be a welfare maximizing DRM,
and assume that the following conditions are satis￿ed: (1) There exist i, k and k0
such that ai
k0i 6= 0. (2) There exists an open set of ￿
i such that, depending on the
realization of ￿
￿i, the welfare maximizing alternative is either k or k0. Then, if (￿;t)












































To see this, consider a setting where all agents￿ preferences coincide with total
welfare. If a DRM chooses the welfare maximizing alternative (without any transfer),
every agent has obviously an incentive to report truthfully. Thus, conditions (4)
must be satis￿ed for such preferences, yielding (6). In other words, condition (6)
must hold for the interim expected probabilities generated by any mechanism that
chooses the welfare-maximizing alternative! But, the incentive constraints (with
respect to the original preferences) imply conditions (4). Combining (4) and (6) we
get (5).
Since the above formulation is relatively abstract, it is helpful to consider a
simple auction example:
Example 12 There are two objects A and B, and two bidders i = 1; 2. Each bidder





B): Bidder i￿ s valuations (which depend only on i￿ s












AB: We refer to si
AB as i￿ s synergy term, and assume that these terms are common
knowledge.
Consider a direct truthful mechanism with associated interim expected proba-
bilities qi
P(￿
i), where the partition P = Pij, denotes the allocation where object A is
allocated to agent i and object B to agent j (thus Pii denotes the allocation where i
gets both objects, and so on..). At points of twice continuous di⁄erentiability (a.e.),
29Note that every bidder receives a signal of lower dimension than the the number of partitions,
or even than the number of bundles he cares about.















































Consider now the welfare-maximizing allocation rule, and let e qi
P(￿
i) denote the ex-
pected probability that the partition P is chosen conditional on i￿ s signal ￿
i. Since
such an allocation can be implemented whenever agents￿preferences coincide with







































Bj = 0; (i.e., unless there are no informational externalities)
equations (7) and (8) are not compatible. To see that, assume for concreteness that
the partition Pjj is never welfare-maximizing (say, because s
j
AB is negative with a
large absolute value), and assume that ai
Bj = 0 while ai
Aj > 0: Then e qi
Pjj = 0, and it
















Pii + e qi
Pji]:
In some non-generic cases, the welfare-maximizing allocation rule can be imple-
mented even when there are informational externalities. This is, for example, the
case when si
AB = 0; i = 1;2 and when a
￿i
Xi < 1; X = A;B;i = 1;2: Given the


















































X) denotes the interim expected probability that good X is allocated
to i conditional on ￿
i
X . Conditions (7) and (8) are always met for such separable
30For example, if the synergy term si
AB is non-positive, and if partition Pji is sometimes welfare





32allocation functions, no matter what ai
Xj are31, and the welfare-maximizing rule can
be implemented using separate, one dimensional second-price auctions.
To sum up, welfare-maximizing is impossible in auctions with interdependent
values and multidimensional signals32 except in cases where the allocation problem
can be divided in separate one-object, one-dimensional auctions. Such a separation is
usually impossible if there are complementarities/substitutabilities and/or allocative
externalities33.
4.2.1 Possibility Results and Applications
One-dimensional signals: For a two-bidder, one-object auction with interde-
pendent values Maskin (1992) has shown that welfare maximization can be achieved
if both bidders have a one-dimensional signal, and if a single crossing condition holds.
This observation has been extended to other one-dimensional settings. Krishna
(2003) derives conditions (stronger than single-crossing) ensuring the e¢ ciency of the
English ascending auction even if there are more bidders. Kirchkamp and Moldovanu
(2004) experimentally compare the performance of the English and second-price
sealed-bid auctions with interdependent valuations: as predicted by theory, the
English auction is superior from an e¢ ciency point of view. Dasgupta and Maskin
(2000), Perry and Reny (2002) and Ausubel (2004) present welfare-maximizing bid-
31The requirement that ai
Xj < 1 is derived from the standard one-dimensional incentive com-
patibility condition that an agent with a higher signal should receive the good with a higher
probability.
32This result applies to the the design of private industries. If ￿rms hold multi-dimensional
private information (say on ￿xed and marginal cost), then it is impossible to induce a welfare
maximizing market structure even if there are no costs to public funds. This is illustrated in Jehiel
and Moldovanu (2004), and contrasts the analysis of Dana and Spier (1994), Auriol and La⁄ont
(1992), and McGuire and Riordan (1995).
33Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) contains an early impossibility result in a one-object
auction with allocative externalities, interdependent values and multidimensional signals.
33ding schemes for multi-object auctions where agents have one-dimensional signals.
Within the above described linear model, we provide now a condition ensuring
that welfare maximization can be obtained when each agent i receives a one di-
mensional signal ￿





















k0j > 1: Then there exists a welfare-maximizing, Bayesian in-
centive compatible mechanism.
The set of parameters for which welfare maximization can be achieved is now
an open set, and it has positive measure. The fundamental di⁄erence is due to the
incentive constraints that now reduce to a simple monotonicity condition (without
the complex integrability requirement). The relevant mechanism for the above result
follows the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves logic by completely dampening the in￿ uence of
one￿ s own signal on one￿ s own transfer.
Gresik (1991), Fieseler, Kittsteiner and Moldovanu (2003), Kittsteiner (2003),
Jehiel and Pauzner (2004), Ornelas and Tuner (2004) and Brusco, Lopomo, and
Wiswanathan (2004) analyze properties of trading models with interdependent val-
ues and one-dimensional signals in a variety of settings that combine features of the
classical models due to Akerlof (1970), Myerson-Satterthwaite (19831) and Cramton-
Gibbons-Klemperer (1987). For example, Fieseler et al. (2003) show that negative
(positive) informational externalities make it easier (harder) to construct welfare-
maximizing, budget balanced and individual-rational mechanisms than in analogous
cases with private values. Jehiel and Pauzner (2005) show that extreme ownership
structures may dominate mixed ownerships in partnership dissolution setups with
interdependent values and one-sided private information.
34Hain and Mitra (2004) and Kittsteiner and Moldovanu (2005) analyze scheduling
and queueing problems, respectively, where agents have private information about
processing times: this naturally yields a model with informational externalities since
waiting costs depend on information available to others. Gruener and Kiel (2004)
focus on collective decisions with interdependent values in the absence of mone-
tary transfers. Finally, Bergemann and Valimaki (2002) focus on the incentives for
information acquision with interdependent values.
Correlated signals Our impossibility results (Theorems 10 and 11) assumed
that the signals are independently distributed across agents. If the signals held by
various agents are correlated, it is possible to design subtle transfer devices whereby
the belief held by agent i on the signal of agent j is elicited for free. When j￿ s belief
about i￿ s signal completely determines the signal held by i34, a welfare-maximizing
allocation can be (approximately) implemented, using the logarithmic scoring rule
used in Johnson et al. (1990) and Johnson et al. (2003). It is important to note
that the approach developed by Cremer-McLean (1985, 1988) is not useful35 here
since it relies on the existence of a welfare-maximizing mechanism. As shown above,
this fails if there are informational externalities and multidimensional signals.
To illustrate Johnson et al.￿ s idea, suppose that agent j believes that i￿ s signal
is distributed according to the density ￿(￿
i), and that agent j is asked to report
her belief to a designer who observes the realization of ￿
i (in equilibrium this will
be reported by i). Suppose further that (up to a constant) agent j receives lne ￿(￿
i)
conditional on ￿
i , where e ￿ is the report made by j about ￿36. Agent j will optimally
34In two recent papers, Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2005) challenge the view that,
generically, there is a one-to one mapping from j￿ s belief onto i￿ s type in the correlated case.
35McLean and Postelwaite (2004) use this approach, but only for situations where agents are
informationally small.
36We assume (for now) that the report made by j is not used to implement a social alternative.
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The welfare-maximizing allocation can be now (approximately) implemented
whenever there is a one-to-one mapping from j￿ s belief onto i￿ s signal: by hav-
ing a transfer that puts a su¢ ciently large weight on lne ￿(￿
i); agent j will have the
right incentive to report her true belief on i￿ s signal (the belief being isomorphic to
her type). This result does not rely on the form of the preferences, and it is solely
driven by the facts that di⁄erent types correspond to di⁄erent beliefs, and that be-
liefs can be elicited for free when there is no restriction on the size of the transfers.
Arbitrarily large transfers (via the weight on lne ￿(￿
i)) are required whenever dis-
tributions of types are almost independent across agents. If bounds on transfers
are imposed (because, say, of limited liability constraints) our impossibility result
persists whenever the distribution of signals is not too far from the independent
case.
Conditioning on extra information: Mezzetti (2004) considers a di⁄erent
informational environment. After the social alternative has been chosen, and before
monetary payments have been concluded, the agents observe their payo⁄ from the
chosen alternative37. Thus, agents receive information in addition to their initial
signals. Mezzetti observes that an e¢ cient mechanism can be implemented in two
stages: In stage 1, agents report their signals; based on the reports, the value maxi-
mizing alternative is implemented. In stage 2, transfers are implemented according
to a VCG mechanism based on reports about the observed payo⁄s in the alterna-
tive chosen at stage 1. Mezzetti￿ s insight is valuable, but the proposed mechanism
su⁄ers from a number of serious drawbacks. First, at stage 2, agents are completely
37Hansen (1985) is an early paper on auction with contingent payments in settings where addi-
tional information becomes available.
36indi⁄erent about their announcement, since it only serves to compute the transfers
received by others . This is in sharp contrast with the agents￿strictly positive in-
centive (due to the unresolved uncertainty about the chosen alternative) to report
their true types in the VCG mechanism in the private values case. Second, in many
applications, a signi￿cant amount of time may elapse before the payo⁄ attached to
a chosen alternative is revealed to an agent. Then, allowing for transfers that are
contingent on information that becomes available in a distant future seems imprac-
tical38.
4.3 Ex-post Implementation without Welfare Maximization
Bayesian mechanism design has been criticized on the ground that both the designer
and the agents need a lot of information about the distribution of the private signals
in order to choose their best course of action.39 Robust implementation seeks for a
stronger notion of implementation where the agents and the designer do not need
such precise information. In private value contexts, this leads to dominant strat-
egy implementation, whereas the analogous concept for settings with informational
externalities is ex-post implementation40: Agents should ￿nd it optimal to report
their true signals even after learning the signals received by others. Such a notion is
necessary for robustness since, in particular, implementation should be possible for
the degenerate belief that other agents￿signals are given by a speci￿c realization. It
38This pertains also to the lemons market. Mezzetti￿ s philosophy suggests that there is no
problem for a buyer and a seller to agree on price after the buyer observes quality (say after one
year of driving a used car). In our opinion, such mechanisms are fragile due to the noisy and
subjective assessments of quality, moral hazard, veri￿ability, etc....
39This is sometimes referred to as Wilson￿ s critique.
40This notion corresponds to the uniform equilibrium ￿rst de￿ned by d￿ Aspremont and Gerard
Varet (1979), and to uniform incentive compatibility as de￿ned by Holmstrom and Myerson (1983).
The term ex-post equilibrium is due to Cremer and McLean (1985).
37is also su¢ cient in quasi-linear environments since ex-post implementation requires
that, whatever their beliefs about others￿types, agents ￿nd it optimal to report their
true types whenever other agents are expected to report truthfully. These ideas have
been recently formalized by Bergemann and Morris (2005).41
An immediate corollary of the main result in subsection 4.2 is that, generically,
the welfare-maximizing allocation cannot be robustly implemented if there are mul-
tidimensional signals and informational externalities (if it were, welfare-maximizing
Bayes-Nash implementation would be possible for any prior, including the indepen-
dent case; but this was shown to be false!)
It turns out that, for generic valuation functions, no deterministic social rule that
makes use of the agents￿reports can be ex post implemented. To state formally this
result, consider choice functions   : S ! K, with the property that there are
transfers functions ti : S ! R, such that truth-telling is an ex-post equilibrium in
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2 ￿i and ￿
￿i 2 ￿￿i. Such a choice rule   is said to be ex post imple-
mentable. We call a choice function   trivial if it is constant on the interior ￿ of
the type space.
By requiring optimality of i￿ s truth-telling for every realization of other agents
types ￿
￿i, inequality (9) treats ￿
￿i as if it was known to agent i. Her incentive
constraint is thus equivalent to a monopolistic screening problem for every ￿
￿i.





for the various alternatives,
and let the individuals choose among them. In equilibrium all agents must agree on
a most favorable alternative:
41See also Dasgupta, Hammond, Maskin, (1979) and Ledyard (1978) for early, related arguments
in private value frameworks.
38Lemma 14 (Ex-Post Taxation Principle) A choice function   is ex post im-
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The di¢ culty of ￿nding an ex-post implementable rule is that (10) should be
simultaneously satis￿ed for all agents i.
To illustrate our impossibility result, we now reduce the problem by assuming
that there are only two agents, i = 1;2 and two alternatives k;l. Because agents￿
incentives are only responsive to di⁄erences in payo⁄s, it is convenient to focus on
relative valuations42 ￿i and relative prices ￿
i :
￿
i (￿) = v
i


















Assuming, that relative prices ￿ are continuous, the taxation principle implies
that at a signal ￿ such that agent i is indi⁄erent between the two alternatives, agent
j should also be indi⁄erent (since they agree on the preferred alternative). That is,
￿




= 0 , ￿





Assuming further that relative prices ￿ are di⁄erentiable, condition (11) implies that
the gradients of agents￿ s payo⁄functions must be parallel on the indi⁄erence set (i.e.,


















are parallel on the indi⁄erence set. For di⁄erentiable relative price functions, this
implies:
42For technical simplicity, we assume that relative valuations satisfy the mild requirement
r￿i￿i (￿) 6= 0 for all ￿ 2 ￿.
39Proposition 15 (Jehiel et al. 2005) Let ( ;t) be a non-trivial ex-post incentive
compatible mechanism. If the relative transfers ￿
i are di⁄erentiable for all i 2 f1;2g
then, there exist an indi⁄erence signal pro￿le b ￿, and a vector y (with the dimension-
ality of ￿
i) such that r￿i￿i (￿) and (r￿i￿￿i (￿)￿y) are parallel for every indi⁄erence




Jehiel et al. (2005) extend the above intuition to the case where the relative
price function is neither di⁄erentiable, nor continuous. This yields:
Theorem 16 (Jehiel et al. 2005) Assume that the dimension of the signal ￿
i is at
least two for each agent i = 1;2. Then, for generic preferences43, only trivial social
choice rules are ex-post implementable.












Example 17 De￿ne valuations v by:
v
i





































































































l = 0 is necessary for such vectors to remain




l . It follows from Proposition 15 that a non-trivial




l = 0: The above condition is
43The result holds both for topological and measure-theoretic notions of genericity
40obviously non-generic: the set of parameters where it is satis￿ed has zero Lebesgue-
measure in the 8-dimensional space of coe¢ cients that parameterize the bi-linear
valuations in this example.
The impossibility result of Theorem 16 should be contrasted with an elegant re-
sult due to Roberts (1979). Roberts requires that each agent i gets a one-dimensional










P): He also assumes that 1) There are at least 3
relevant partitions, and 2) For any x 2 <jPj there exists ￿
i = (￿
i




P)gP2P = x: With these assumptions, Roberts shows that a deterministic
social choice function ￿ is dominant strategy implementable only if there is a set of
real weights f￿igi=1;2;::N , not all equal to zero, and a set of real weights f￿PgP2P







Thus, dominant strategy implementable social choice functions must maximize
a weighted average of the agents values, augmented by a partition-speci￿c weight.
Jehiel et al. (2004) call these functions a¢ ne maximizers. The "rich preference
space" condition 2 above45 implies that agents must care about the entire partition
of goods. Thus, there must be allocative externalities for Roberts￿characterization
to hold.
4.3.1 Possibility results
We now review several situations that allow for non-trivial ex-post implementation.
In all cases, the geometric condition of Proposition 15 is less restrictive.
1) Theorem 16 heavily relies on the impossibility of simultaneously satisfying the
44This last assumption can be relaxed. See Jehiel et. al. (2004).
45Bickchandani et al. (2004), Gui et al. (2004) and Lavi et al. (2004) characterize dominant-
strategy implementability on restricted domains where condition 2 need not hold.
41incentive constraints of several agents. If there is only one strategic agent, non-trivial
ex post implementation is possible46.
2) If all agents have a one-dimensional signal47, or if only one agent has a multi-
dimensional signal then non-trivial ex post implementation is possible for some open
set of preferences (see Jehiel et al. 2005).
3) Consider preferences vi











can be ex-post implemented. Under some technical conditions, only such a¢ ne
maximizers can be implemented (see Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn and Moldovanu, 2004).
This is the counterpart to Roberts￿(1979) result in the private values case.
4) Another non generic but interesting class is studied by Bikchandani (2004).
He considers a one-object auction without allocative externalities and observes that,
by not selling the object for a su¢ ciently large subset of signals, a non-trivial (yet
very ine¢ cient) choice rule can be ex-post implemented.
5 Conclusion
We have studied the e⁄ects of allocative and informational externalities in auctions
and related mechanisms. Because values become endogenous, standard auctions
cease to be welfare maximizing in the presence of allocative externalities, and they
give rise to a wealth of new phenomena. But the traditional Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanisms achieve welfare maximization in such frameworks, as long as there are
no informational externalities. Informational externalities can be satisfactorily dealt
with only in settings where signals are one-dimensional (and where a single-crossing
46This should be contrasted with the impossibility of e¢ cient Nash-Bayes implementation, which
holds as soon as at least one agent has multidimensional private information.
47In this case, the geometric condition merely requires that some scalars (rather than vectors)
are multiples of each other
42property holds). For example, an English ascending auction is welfare maximizing in
one-object symmetric settings, and generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms
are welfare- maximizing even in asymmetric settings as long as signals are scalars.
The situation drastically changes when information is multidimensional (as required
by general multi-object applications): VCG mechanisms have no analogues, and
robust implementation does not allow the use of private information.
We have tried to show that externalities naturally arising in many applications
have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the outcome of auctions and other mechanisms. From
an empirical viewpoint, it is now time to investigate the role (magnitude and e⁄ect
on bidding strategies) of allocative externalities in auctions - this could parallel the
exciting recent work on common value auctions (see Athey and Haile, 2005).
From a theoretical viewpoint, the above analysis leaves open a number of impor-
tant questions. In particular, since informational externalities make it impossible to
implement the welfare-maximizing allocation, how does the second-best allocation
look like in such contexts? Since ex-post implementation is generally impossible with
informational externalities, what is a good way to achieve robust implementation?
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